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John Keegan. A History oJWaifare. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993, 432 pages, $36.95.

K

eegan's A History of Warfare is a long
and very uneven account of the
"organized violence" which has dogged the
history of humanity since the beginning of
organized society. The attempt to encompass
the whole of the human race in his account is
wholly praiseworthy as are his divisions of
warfare into four main sections - stone,
flesh, iron and fire - which roughly
correspond with the weapons at the disposal
of the combatants. These sections are
interrupted by four quite separate and often
quite unrelated essays on topics such as
"Limitations on Warmaking," "Fortifications,"
"Armies" and "Logistics and Supply." Keegan's
military history is conventional; he deals
adequately with various well-rehearsed topics
from Alexander the Great to Hitler, adding
little to what he and many other historians
have said in similar but usually less ambitious
accounts. One drawback of trying to do so
much, however, is that the period for which
there is most evidence, that is the last five
hundred years, is covered in a rather
breathless fashion in the chapter entitled
"Fire" which attempts to encompass the
history of warfare for the whole world from
the first cannon to the hydrogen bomb in 69

pages, of which thirteen are devoted to the
Second World War.
Had Keegan restricted himself to the
history of warfare he would have produced a
reasonable and sometimes stimulating
account. Unfortunately he tries to do much
more than that. The whole first section, some
60 pages, seems to be a speculative essay,
entitled "War in Human History" which has
less to do with history and more to do with an
attack on Clausewitz. He begins with the
portentous statement that "War is not a
continuation of policy by other means" [p.3].
Contradicting Clausewitz is hardly an earthshaking position. The problem is, however,
that from there on, and for the next twentyfive pages, Clausewitz serves as a kind of
whipping-horse for some of Keegan's less
carefully considered flights of fancy.
Clausewitz becomes a symbol for all things
that Keegan considers have gone wrong with
ancient society. This is apparently because
Clausewitz was a "child of Aristotle" and
therefore believed in the supreme importance
of "politics." Warfare, argues Keegan, is not
an extension of politics but of"culture." That
may be an entirely defensible position but
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having so clearly demonstrated that
Clausewitz was wrong he might then surely
have left him alone and explained his own
theory of the relationship between "culture"
and "warmaking." But he does not do thathe goes on berating Clausewitz not only for
being wrong but also for being right, that is by
showing how when people adopt Clausewitz's
ideas, as they seem to do more often than can
really be demonstrated from the record, they
destroy themselves. His first example in the
next section, entitled "War as Culture," is
from Easter Island - in brief, the Easter
Islanders destroyed themselves because they
made war an extension of politics, they
followed Clausewitz and "Clausewitzian
warfare did not serve the ends of Polynesian
culture" [p.28]. Next come the Zulus "Shaka was a perfect Clausewitzian . . . In
short the rise and fall of the Zulu nation offers
an awful warning of the short-comings of the
Clausewitzian analysis" [p.32]. We go on to
the Mamelukes, who are, of course, destroyed
by Napoleon and "Clausewitz, if he knew the
facts did not draw the inference" (that culture
was as powerful a force as politics in the
choice of military means and often more
likely to prevail), though nothing in this or
the next section on the Samurai seems to
prove his point; the Samurai are unClausewitzian because they preserve, at least
for a time, their own culture, (swords rather
than guns) which surprisingly enough, was
not influenced by Clausewitz. Nowhere does
Keegan seem to realize that if "Culture,"
defined on p.46 as practically everything that
human beings do and think, is indeed the
core of all societies then of course by that very
definition "politics" can be no more separate
from "culture" than warfare. The relationship
between these two products of "culture" do
need some close examination, even if
Clausewitz is not the last word, or even the
most important thinker, on this subject.
But Keegan has a different agenda. He
begins the last section of the introductory
chapter which he calls "Culture without War"
by suggesting that Clausewitz really
represents the heart of "western culture"
because of the primacy in which "politics"
was held by that "culture" from Aristotle
onwards. He concedes that Clausewitz might

not have understood the importance of
"cultural history" because Voltaire did not.
He uses Berlin's essay on Vico to illustrate
the relative newness of"comparative history"
although one is not quite clear that he has
understood the import of that essay.
Clausewitz did not understand the importance
of Oxus ... "Military historians now recognize
that the banks of the Oxus are to warfare
what Westminster is to parliamentary
democracy. . . . " It does get very confusing
because within a page Clausewitz is cheering
Robert McNamara for threatening the world
with nuclear annihilation - the ultimate
Clausewitzian "war" - which despite the
veneration of him by the "post -war academics"
has not be fought. Clausewitz in this section
is blamed almost on the same page for
attempting to recreate an archaic "warrior
society" and being responsible for the creation
of "nuclear deterrence abhorrent to humane
sentiment," . . . he was also, of course,
responsible for the huge casualties of the
First World War. The point that the twentieth
century
has
seen
a
substantial
"remilitarization" is hardly a new one but it is
not one that can be attributed solely to
Clausewitz. Perhaps there is some need to
look at politics after all, even if politics is only
a reflection of "cultural" history. As he ends
this rather muddled section, Keegan suggests
that war can be abolished in the same way as
the world has gotten rid of slavery, infanticide,
human sacrifice and duelling - "'Tis a
consummation Devoutly to be wish'd," but
the idea that war will simply cease because
humanity will realize that" costs clearly exceed
benefits" seems to suggest that in the past
people have most often fought wars out of
calculation rather than fear, not really an
adequate interpretation. Even more curious
is the fact that in his interlude "Limitations
on Warmaking" there is no reference at all to
either cultural or political limitations to
warfare, only limitations brought about by
"the laws of nature" [p.71]. This interlude
also includes a somewhat tangential
discussion of naval warfare.
The chapter entitled "Stone" begins with
the question of why men fight at all and
attempts in a few pages to summarize the
latest debates amongst psychologists and
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anthropologists. This useful but somewhat
abbreviated section leads us into the general
history of warfare and Keegan attempts from
there on to include in his discussion as many
societies as possible. This follows more or
less conventional lines but the "cultural"'
connection is everywhere vague and somewhat
simplistic. Thus the Greek phalanx made
warfare far more terrible than it had been in
its more "primitive" version but the
explanation for not seeking a "Clausewitzian"
solution was that either "there nevertheless
remained strong traces of primitivism in Greek
warmaking" or that "invasion of city state's
fields [was] ... the violation of tabu" [p.251].
This was hardly a very sophisticated
interpretation of Greek culture, which
moreover does not explain how Alexander the
Great escaped from these limitations so
readily.
Keegan is a forceful writer and some of
the sections in the book, particularly the
ones dealing with the "horse people," are
interesting and thought-provoking. The
difficulty is that Keegan has tried to write two
books at the same time. This becomes most
obvious as he comes to the end of the section
on "Fire" and in his "Conclusion." The
relationship between "culture" and "warfare"
is never really properly explored; the whole
question of restraint, other than "primitive
ritualization," and of international law hardly
get any mention, except briefly on pp.382-3,
almost as a kind of after-thought. The rather
well-known essays which do in fact deal with
the relationship between war and "culture,"
such as John Nef's "War and Human
Progress," which not only deals with "culture"
but also has some very sharp criticisms of
Clausewitz, or A. Vagts "History of Militarism,"
which again has a very negative interpretation
of Clausewitz and his influence, are missing
from the bibliography and their ideas do not
seem to have been incorporated into this
work. The same may be said of Q. Wright's
classic "A Study of War" and Fuller's "The
Conduct of War, 1789-1961" with its
devastating chapter on Clausewitz. The idea
that Clausewitz is universally admired in
"academic circles" hardly bears much
examination.

In the "Conclusion" Keegan states that
he hopes that he has illustrated that there
are no simple answers to what war is or that
it has only one nature. There can be no
disagreement with this. Keegan goes on to
repeat that "Culture is, nevertheless, the
prime determinant of the nature of warfare"
[p.387] and shows that "oriental" warfare is
characterized by special features
one may
again agree but it would be helpful to have
some statement about the relationship
between "oriental culture," which seems to
include everything from the Mongol
conquerors to Chinese, Japanese and Islamic
civilizations and "warmaking." Their methods
all included "restraint," unlike Alexander the
Great and the Greeks. Yet almost on the next
page Keegan explains that the Crusades
"resolved the inherent Christian dilemma over
the morality of warmaking by transmitting to
the West the ethic of holy war ... " [p.390].
Still it was "oriental restraint" that succumbed
to the "ruthlessness it was not prepared or
able to mobilize even in self-defence" against
the Western style of warfare. Since that very
style of warfare has "brought disaster and
threatened catastrophe" [p.391], the world
must now learn from "oriental" restraint and
from the "primitive" world also. "Politics
must continue, war cannot" - all fine
sentiments and ones with which few can take
exception - we even need to keep our
"warriors" provided they only fight against
"ethnic bigots, regional warlords, ideological
intransigents and organized international
criminals" [p.392]. Again, who can quarrel
with that? Keegan will get proper praise for
voicing such sentiments, but a book
explaining the difficult connection between
"culture" and "warfare" over the whole of
human history, or even only in the twentieth
century, has still to be written.

Robert Vogel, Professor of History at
McGill University and co-author of the
Maple LeafRoute, passed away on April
1, 1994. He will be sorely missed by
CMH and its readers.
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